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Survival modelling of Australian politicians 
Marc Westa and Bernard Kachoyanb* 
Are Australian political leaders an endangered species? A survival analysis of 
Australian politicians shows that modern leaders are having almost as tough a 
time as leaders were in the early days of Australian politics. This article examines 
the tenures of Prime Ministers and Federal Opposition Leaders to show that while 
the leadership turnover of the last decade has been high, the modern era is not 
unlike the Australian parliament after 1901, albeit for different reasons. The 
parliamentary tenures of members of the House of Representatives and the 
Senate, male and female members of both houses, and Labor and Liberal leaders 
have been compared using the survival analysis technique, and while simple 
statistical tests and descriptors may show little overall difference between the 
various survival curves, there are often intriguing differences in the detail. For 
instance, there is evidence supporting the notion that women have historically not 
been preselected in safe seats. The differing electoral cycles are apparent in the 
Senate and House of Representative data, as is the historical under-representation 
of women. Labor leaders tend to have had a higher survival rate, at least in the 
short term, than their Liberal counterparts, while longer time periods are 
influenced by long serving Liberal Prime Ministers. 
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Survival modelling of Australian politicians 
Introduction 
Is Australian federal politics in the midst of a febrile era of leadership change? Since the 
2007 federal election, there have been six Prime Ministers (Rudd (#1), Gillard, Rudd 
(#2), Abbott, Turnbull, Morrison) and six Opposition Leaders (Nelson, Turnbull, 
Abbott, Bowen, Shorten, Albanese). In Australia, the selection of party leaders lies in 
the hands of the parliamentary party and historically leaders have been appointed and 
removed in an almost “Darwinian” process (Gauja 2014). Prime Ministers can be 
removed without an election, and a leadership challenge, even when unsuccessful, can 
often be the start of a Prime Minister’s downfall (Weller 1994). 
The survival of a member of parliament, whether in the House of 
Representatives (HOR) or the Senate, is by definition less fraught than that of the 
leaders, given that you need to be a member of parliament to be Prime Minister (PM) or 
Opposition Leader (OL). Parliamentary tenure usually starts and finishes at an election 
(general or by-election), although parliamentarians may leave for a variety of reasons 
between elections, and in the Senate, may be appointed without election.  
This article will examine the survival curves of various cohorts of Australian 
parliamentarians to test several commonly held beliefs about their tenures. In general, 
survival curves describe the probability that an individual will survive a certain amount 
of time, where “survival” is defined according to the context of the problem. In our 
context, it means leadership or parliamentary tenure. There is considerable value in 
examining the whole survival curve in order to identify events that occur at specific 
times or in time ranges not available through simple statistical measures such as average 
length of tenure (Rich et al. 2010, Kachoyan and West 2016). This article will compare 
the survival of PMs and OLs, leaders of the Liberal Party of Australia and the 
 
 
Australian Labor Party (hereafter referred to as “Liberal” and “Labor” respectively), 
members of the HOR and the Senate, and male and female parliamentarians. The 
differences across political eras will also be considered to test the proposition that the 
current era of high PM turnover is unprecedented. 
Theory 
Leadership turnover since 2007 has created a popular view, not only in Australia but 
internationally, that leadership spills are an Australian “national sport” (Rudra 2018). 
Instability is seen as feature of modern Australian politics, and this gives rise to various 
societal beliefs, some with more connection to reality than others. For instance, the 
popular view that Labor leaders are rolled in short order is probably due to the high 
turnover of Labor leaders, mostly in New South Wales state politics, in the 2000s 
(Aarons 2010, Nicholls and Oakes 2010). There have been a number of PM changes on 
both sides of politics in the recent past, and OLs have had the longer tenures, a marked 
difference to the 1990s. However, as attaining the Prime Ministership is the ultimate 
goal of an OL, one might have expected the power of incumbency to increase a PM’s 
survival over the OL. Survival analysis allows us to look more closely at these 
phenomena. 
There are various possible reasons why we have seen such a high PM turnover 
in the recent past. Parties are becoming increasingly “presidentialized” (Gauja 2015) 
and politics increasingly “candidate-centred” (Wattenberg 1991). Representatives 
transmit their political missives instantly through social media, but being more visible 
than ever before comes with vulnerability, with their survival tied more to their 
individual popularity than performance (McAllister 2003). And with a dwindling 
differentiation between their major policy platforms, Labor and Liberal are increasingly 
fighting battles over totemic issues like climate change, attempting to minimise gaffes 
 
 
and win popularity through sounds-bites in the 24-hour news cycle. Leadership turmoil 
is an outcome of this cycle. 
The Senate and the HOR, despite being housed in the same building, have 
distinctive cultures and tasks, and are elected by separate voting methods. It is plausible 
that, with the comparatively lower thresholds for election to the Senate due to 
proportional voting, it is easier to be elected to the Senate given party endorsement than 
to the HOR, especially if listed in the first or second spot on your party’s ticket; in the 
Senate you need to satisfy your party (and your factions) while in the HOR you need to 
appease your constituency (Brenton 2009). Senate candidates also have significantly 
different personal and political backgrounds to their HOR colleagues (Farrell and 
McAllister 1995). By Westminster convention, PMs and OLs sit in the HOR, where 
members engage in the theatrical cut and thrust of political battle. The only PM from 
the Senate, Sir John Gorton, resigned his Senate position after becoming PM and was 
elected as a member of the HOR. The HOR and Senate are therefore two quite different 
places, and these factors, along with the extended electoral cycle of the Senate, could 
lead to speculation that Senate tenure is more stable than HOR tenure. Furthermore, the 
effect of safe versus marginal seats and the power of incumbency might lead to 
speculation that the hazard rate (that is, the rate at which they leave parliament) would 
decrease over time until a natural retirement period is reached. Conversely, some 
studies have found a constant hazard (Casstevens and Denham III 1970). Through 
survival analysis we will test these hypotheses. 
There is also a popular belief that women tend not to be pre-selected in safe 
seats (Chau 2016), and survival analysis allows us to test this idea. Women have 
historically been underrepresented in international parliaments, facing barriers to entry 
and internal promotion opportunities. For example, for ministers in three Westminster 
 
 
countries (Australia, Canada and New Zealand) between 1949-2012, it was found that 
women experience a significantly lower rate of cabinet promotion than their male 
counterparts (Curtin, Kerby, and Dowding 2014). One of the disadvantages for women 
in Westminster systems is the tradition of single-member electorates. Multimember 
electorates facilitate women’s and minority representation, giving parties an incentive to 
construct tickets appealing to all sections of the community. Women have generally 
been better represented in houses of parliament elected by proportional representation 
than in those elected from single-member constituencies (Sawer, Tremblay, and 
Trimble 2006).  
Internationally, some studies on female parliamentary survival have been 
undertaken. For ministers in the Quebec Executive Council between 1976 and 2012, 
ministerial careers of women follow a similar trajectory to that of men and are not any 
less illustrious (Tremblay et al. 2015). Other studies in this regard include a study of the 
Italian post-war parliament, in which the parliamentary survival of women was much 
greater than that of men for the period from 1946 to 2010. However, after splitting the 
epoch into two, it was found that gender is significant for survival only in the second era 
when most parties had adopted quotas for women (Fedeli and Forte 2011). Similarly, 
for ministerial tenure in the UK from 1945-1997, female ministers have lower hazard 
(higher survival) (Berlinski, Dewan, and Dowding 2007). 
Modelling Details 
These types of problems are commonly addressed using Kaplan-Meier (KM) estimators, 
more commonly known as the Product Limit Estimator (PLE) (Kaplan and Meier 1958, 
Klein and Moeschberger 2003). An important property of the PLE is that it is non-
parametric; the PLE only uses the data to generate an estimate of the “true” underlying 
survival function, although attempts can be made to derive theoretical survival curves 
 
 
(Kachoyan and West 2018). It allows for more reliable inferences from the data about 
political processes than parametric models (Golub 2008). This technique has been used 
across many fields of endeavour with broad applicability. Some recent relevant 
examples in the political sphere include: a study of the survival of members of the 
Italian Parliament (Fedeli and Forte 2011, Borghetto and Visconti 2015); the turnover 
rate of individual cabinet members in the Netherlands from 1946 to 2010 (Bovens, 
Brandsma, and Thesingh 2015); the waiting time to become a minister in Canada 
(Kerby 2009), and Canadian federal cabinet ministerial appointment and exit (Kerby 
2011); cabinet careers and gender in Australia, Canada and New Zealand (Curtin, 
Kerby, and Dowding 2014); the mortality risk of heads of government compared to 
candidates who never served (Olenski, Abola, and Jena 2015); American Congressional 
tenure survival modelling (Scully 1995); Ministerial tenure in the UK (Berlinski, 
Dewan, and Dowding 2007); the tenure of central bank governors (Ennser-Jedenastik 
2014). 
An important advantage of the PLE method is that it can take account of 
censored data in a relatively straightforward manner and hence is a more appropriate 
approach than least squares regression (Kerby 2009). In general, censored data refers to 
an individual leaving the observable data set after surviving for a certain period and 
without being observed to fail. A censored data point in the context of parliamentary 
survival analysis would refer to either careers that are still extant at the time the 
modelling was undertaken, or a parliamentary career where the cause of “death” (that is, 
how it ended) is not one we consider a failure. We have been conservative in our 
censoring in that only parliamentarians who died in office or who, with specific 
reference to PMs and OLs, were caretakers were assumed to have had censored careers. 
PMs who died in office were Lyons, Curtin and Holt, and caretaker PMs were Page, 
 
 
Forde and McEwen. OLs who died in office were Tudor and Chifley, and the only 
caretaker OL was Bowen. Even though we know that Australia’s longest serving PM, 
Robert Menzies, left parliament of his own volition, for consistency we have not 
censored his career. Naturally, all representatives who were still in parliament at the 
time of study have not concluded their careers and so have censored tenures. 
It is not at all simple to determine whether a parliamentarian voluntarily retired 
or whether they were coerced by colleagues. A good example of this dilemma is that of 
Herbert Evatt exiting the Labor leadership. His age and health became a concern and his 
exit, to be Chief Justice of the New South Wales Supreme Court, was stage-managed by 
Labor powerbrokers. This is largely regarded as giving him a dignified parliamentary 
exit (Bynander and 't Hart 2007). Is this a voluntary, and therefore censored, exit? It is 
difficult to tell, hence our conservatism in not assuming anything about the conclusions 
of careers. Our approach to censoring is similar to previous work which did not attempt 
to determine if a portfolio change in a study of Westminster systems was a promotion 
(Curtin, Kerby, and Dowding 2014). 
In Australia, the OL is defined as the leader of the party not in government that 
has the most seats in the HOR (Parliamentary Education Office 2018a). An OL who 
ascended to the position of PM is considered to have had a censored career as OL; 
becoming PM is indeed the goal of an OL and they have not been ousted from their job 
due to failure. 
The probability of survival as a function of time, or the probability that the 
survival time t of an individual exceeds a certain value, is given by 𝑆(𝑡) = 𝑷(𝑻 > 𝒕), 
where T is the survival time. The formulation of the PLE is based on the conditional 
probability that an individual dies (or in our case, ceases being PM or OL, or leaves 
parliament) in the time interval from ti to ti+1, given survival up to time ti, which is 
 
 
estimated as 𝑑𝑖/𝑛𝑖  , where di is the number who die at time ti, and ni is the number alive 
just before time ti, including those who will die at time ti. The formulation is intuitive 
and fairly easy to calculate: 






which can be expressed recursively: 





Without censoring, the PLE at any given time is simply the number still alive 
divided by the number originally in the sample. The use of the recursive formulation (2) 
makes it easier to visualise the effect of censored data. The PLE survival estimator is 
piecewise constant with discontinuities at the times of death and appears as a step 
function. The PLE approaches the true survival function for that population as the 
sample size increases and provides a visual depiction of all the raw data. The reduction 
of the sample size at large values means that the effect of each individual death on the 
size of the step-down increases and the accuracy of the estimate decreases. The PLE 
gives no prediction of performance beyond the largest data point if the longest time 
period is censored. 
Our data has been collated from various sources (Department of Parliamentary 
Services 2017, McCann 2016, Bynander and 't Hart 2007, Parliamentary Education 
Office 2018a, b). The PM and OL data have been updated to 31 May 2019, while the 
HOR and Senate data is updated to 11 July 2017. Some manipulation of the source data 
was required due to quirks in the Australian parliamentary system, mostly in the Senate. 
For example, the term of service of a Senator from the Australian Capital Territory or 
the Northern Territory expires at the close of the day preceding the polling day for the 
 
 
general election of members of the HOR (Department of Parliamentary Services 2017). 
Hence it appears that, even when continuing after successful re-election, their Senate 
terms have breaks. We have assumed that Territorian Senators have continuous service 
where they have won at re-election. Other quirks include that of Nancy Buttfield, who 
resigned her Senate position one day before the 1961 election conditional upon her 
election on that date as a Senate candidate (Biographical Dictionary Unit; Research 
Section of the Australian Senate 2010). Her tenure has also been considered continuous. 
There are cases where a Senator had been filling a casual vacancy at the time of an 
election, with their successful re-election only taking effect at some later point and 
hence there was a break between their terms of service (e.g. Tom Drake-Brockman). In 
this case, their service is considered as separate stints. There are relatively few cases of 
this occurring, and this has not been a feature of parliament since 1977, when a 
successful referendum established that the term of a Senator filling a casual vacancy 
would continue until the end of the original senator's term, as opposed to the next 
general election (Department of Parliamentary Services 2017). Individuals who have 
served more than once (for example Kevin Rudd or Robert Menzies as PM, or Janine 
Haines or John “Sandy” MacDonald as Senators) are considered as having separate 
lifespans.  
The logrank test is a popular statistical test to compare the survival curves of 
two groups (Bland and Altman 2004). The logrank test is used to produce p -values, 
which have traditionally been used to help describe the probability that multiple data 
sets come from the same population, hence helping the analyst make a call on whether 
the data sets are different. However, recent debate (known colloquially as the “statistics 
wars”) suggests that p-values are highly vulnerable to misinterpretation and misuse 
(Amrhein, Greenland, and McShane 2019, Wasserstein, Schirm, and Lazar 2019). With 
 
 
regards to the work of this article, attempting to compare two survival curves using a 
single p-value without looking at the curves themselves would overlook the interesting 
differences between the curves that may occur within particular time intervals because 
of interesting reasons, in a similar way to how a simple average clouds details about the 
spread of data in a data set. Obtaining statistical significance with a small sample size 
can also be difficult. Care must be taken not to ascribe reason to noise in the data, 
however observation of the whole survival curve allows us to tease out intriguing facets 
of the minutiae. P-values have been quoted for rigour, but they have not been used in 
and of themselves to draw conclusions. 
Results 
Prime Ministers and Opposition Leaders 
Figure 1 compares the survival curves of PMs and OLs and shows that while OLs have 
a greater short-term survivability, PMs have a higher capacity for very long tenures; 
clearly, there may be little point in keeping an OL who has been unsuccessful at 
multiple elections. Somewhat counterintuitively, OLs out-survive PMs to about six 
years, and over 20% of PMs do not survive a year, a result driven largely by events 
early in Federation. After about three years in office, PM survival improves, suggesting 
that success at their first election is important for a PM’s survival. There is a cluster of 
PM-careers around seven years, beyond which the curve is dominated by the three 
longest serving PMs: the Bradman-like Menzies term, the Bradman-light Howard term 
and the Bradman-Museum-patron Hawke term (Bradman Foundation 2014, Hutchins 
2009, Wade 2019). The biggest danger zone for an OL seems to be around two to three 
years, with another dip around six years, mirroring the electoral cycle. The most recent 
uncensored OL, Bill Shorten, survived just short of six years, a period of two elections. 
 
 
One explanation for the elevated short-term survival of OLs is that if they are 
successful in their position, they are elevated to the role of PM at election and therefore 
have censored OL careers. This has the effect of increasing the short-term values of the 
OL survival curve, while the curve dips when it becomes apparent that longer-term OLs 
are not successful and are replaced. The p value comparing the curves is 0.66. 
 
Figure 1. Survival curves for the Prime Minister and Opposition Leader. 
Labor and Liberal Leaders 
Figure 2 depicts the Labor (since 1901 – 25 leadership terms) and Liberal (since 1945 – 
17 leadership terms) leadership survival curves, irrespective of whether they are in 
Government or Opposition. Liberal leadership is only analysed since 1945 as this is 
when the party was launched, formed by the merger of the United Australia Party with 
other conservative and anti-Labor groups (Hancock 1994). Contrary to the “NSW 
disease” view of Labor leadership (Aarons 2010, Nicholls and Oakes 2010), Figure 2 
suggests that federal Labor leadership is historically more stable than federal Liberal 
leadership, at least in the short-term, with double the chance of surviving more than five 
 
 
years. The parties do not have the same level of survival till about nine years, after 
which the Liberal curve is dominated by Menzies and Howard. The survival of the 
Labor leader decreases almost linearly out to zero at 11 years. The p -value is 0.45. 
 
Figure 2. Survival curves for Labor Party (since 1901) and Liberal Party (since 1945) 
leaders. 
House of Representatives and the Senate 
Figure 3 compares the survival curves for members of the HOR and the Senate and 
shows that intriguingly there is not much overall difference between the survival curves 
(p=0.70), even though they are very different places with different electoral cycles. 
Again, there are some interesting differences in the detail worth examining. As 
expected, once can see the influence of the two electoral cycles, three years for the HOR 
and six years for the Senate, although the effect is smeared somewhat in the HOR due to 
the general elections not having to be held at exactly three year intervals. The HOR is 
more stable in the first three years, until the first election. As Senators are elected for six 
years, they do not face election at the same time as the HOR and hence the Senate 
 
 
survival curve does not markedly change at three years. The regular drops at six year 
intervals in the Senate curve are expected given the predictable Senate electoral cycle; 
these drops are sharper than the three year drops in the HOR. Note that Territorian 
senators have terms the same tenure length as members of the HOR (not fixed six year 
terms like the states). This has a small smoothing effect on the Senate curve. 
 
Figure 3. Survival curves for members of the House of Representatives and members of 
the Senate. 
 
Figure 4 shows the same HOR and Senate survival results using a logarithmic scale. 
That presents a slightly different view which brings out some of the more detailed 
differences between the curves. For example, a straight line would imply a constant 
hazard, however both the Senate and HOR survival curves have a continuously 
increasing hazard (the curves turn downwards) as a parliamentarian’s career progresses. 
This is consistent with previous work that suggested a weariness after a long career 
following an early honeymoon period which benefited from incumbency (Finocchiaro 
 
 
and Lin 2000). There is, however, a surprising linearity in the curve for the Senate in the 
initial six-year period implying there is a hazard for senators even before the first re-
election opportunity. The logarithmic plot in Figure 4 also more explicitly shows the 
diverging curves after about 18 years, at which point Senate survival drops below HOR 
survival. It may be that the HOR has a higher hazard at less than 18 years due to its 
dynamism and increased opportunity for electoral defeat, but it has a slightly increased 
incumbency benefit over the Senate beyond this time. 
 
Figure 4. Survival curves for members of the House of Representatives and members of 
the Senate with logarithmic survival scale. 
Women in Parliament 
A question of interest is whether there is any difference in the careers of males and 
females in parliament. The survival curve results are shown in Figure 5 for the Senate 
and Figure 6 for the HOR. It should be noted that the number of female tenures in the 
HOR is less than 10 percent of the males; hence the male-only curve is largely 
indistinguishable from that in Figure 3. While the Senate is still dominated by men, the 
 
 
difference is not as large (females are roughly 20 per cent of the male population), 
reflecting the notion that women have generally been better represented in houses of 
parliament elected by proportional representation rather than single-member 
constituencies (Sawer, Tremblay, and Trimble 2006). Our study suggests little overall 
difference between the survival of men and women in both houses (p=0.56 in the 
Senate, p=0.73 in the HOR) although once again there are interesting differences in the 
detail. The sharper features of the female curves, especially in the HOR (Figure 6), are 
partly due to the smaller sample size. While the survival for men at very long tenures 
may be higher than for women, women have been historically under-represented in 
parliament and hence have had less opportunity for long tenures. Interestingly, the 
survival of women out to 12 years in both curves is higher than for men, before a period 
of similar survival and then the long tenured men. There is no evidence to suggest that 
overall women have shorter parliamentary careers. 
The following figures provide some confirmatory evidence towards the 
hypothesis that women tend not to be pre-selected in safe seats. This can be seen in the 
larger decrease in survival in the HOR (Figure 6) at the three-year mark for females 
than males; female survival past one election is more tenuous than male survival. One 
further explanation for this is that long-serving members of the HOR tend to be in safe 
seats, and these members tend to be male. It may be that over time, as long-standing 
members retire, this effect dissipates (Raue 2018). The results shown in Figure 5 and 
Figure 6 are broadly in line with other studies using survival modelling techniques to 
examine parliamentary survival  (Tremblay et al. 2015, Fedeli and Forte 2011, 




Figure 5. Survival curves for male and female members of the Senate. 
 
 





Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of the cohorts studied in this article. 





Prime Minister 36 2.9 4.1 
Opposition Leader 45 3.7 4.1 
Liberal Leader 17 2.9 4.9 
Labor Leader 25 5.7 5.6 
     
House of 
Representatives 
Member 1395 9.7 11.6 
Male 1277 9.4 11.6 
Female 118 11.7 10.9 
     
Senate 
Member 649 10.7 11.5 
Male 547 10.3 11.4 
Female 102 12.0 11.9 
Table 1 shows the PLE medians and averages for the various cases we have examined. 
These statistics are different to standard medians and averages due to the special 
treatment of the censored data. The PLE median is the time at which there is 50 per cent 
survival, while the PLE average is the area under the survival curve. The PLE average 
shows little difference between PM and OL; this average has hidden the differences that 
are obvious when observing the whole survival curve, with the long serving PMs 
increasing the average PM term without making any difference to the median. A similar 
effect is seen with the Liberal leadership statistics. The Labor leader PLE average and 
median are about the same due to the linear nature of its survival curve. In most of the 
cases in Table 1, the PLE median is less than the PLE average, because some very long 
tenures increase the averages and thus give a misrepresentation of parliamentary 
survival. Two exceptions to this are women in both houses of parliament. This arises 
from the fact that a large proportion of women who have ever been in parliament are 
currently still there due to their historical under-representation, hence their careers are 
 
 
censored. Additionally, there have not been many women with long tenures compared 
to men. 
Eras of Australian Politics 
Table 2 shows four political eras since 1901, an era defined for this article as having 10 
PM terms. Figure 7 shows the survival curves for PMs for each of those eras.  
Table 2. Political eras in Australia based on 10 Prime Ministers per period. 
Era Name Period Years Prime Ministers PMs OLs 
1 Early 
1 January 1901 –  
27 October 1915 
14.8 
Barton, Deakin (#1), Watson, Reid, 
Deakin (#2), Fisher (#1), Deakin 






27 October 1915 –  
19 December 1949 
34.2 
Hughes, Bruce, Scullin, Lyons*, 
Page**, Menzies (#1), Fadden, 






19 December 1949 –  
3 December 2007 
58.0 
Menzies (#2), Holt*, McEwen**, 
Gorton, McMahon, Whitlam, 
Fraser, Hawke, Keating, Howard 
10 20 
4 Modern 
3 December 2007 –  
31 May 2019 
11.7 
Rudd (#1), Gillard, Rudd (#2), 
Abbott, Turnbull, Morrison*** 
6 6 





Figure 7. Survival curves for the Prime Minister in the four political eras, based on 10 
Prime Ministers per era. 
The choice of 10 PMs per period is somewhat for convenience, but it also natural as it 
allows the post-war era to commence with the lengthy second Menzies term, and the 
modern era to commence after the long Howard term with the shortened first Rudd 
term. It also results in the early parliament containing the three Fisher terms and 
highlights the fact that the modern era of leadership upheaval is not without precedent; 
however, something similar has not been seen since before 1915.  Choosing eras by PM 
rather than time also avoids the technical complications of PM terms straddling eras.  
Table 2 and Figure 7 suggest, the current rate of PM turnover is more like that of 
the early Australian parliament than that of the wartime or post-war eras; PM survival 
beyond three years is uncommon. The early era had multiple parties, parliamentarians 
switched sides, and governments were defeated on the floor of the parliament, meaning 
that PM survival dropped almost as soon as they were endorsed as PM; there was little 
honeymoon period. Comparing the survival curves of the eras, the modern era is 
 
 
somewhat similar to the early parliament (p=0.59), and different from the wartime 
(p=0.14) and post-war (p=0.02) eras. 
While parliamentary conditions are not the same as in the early parliament, we 
can postulate various reasons why the modern era has seen a high PM turnover. Citizen 
journalism and social media, as more politicians adopt its use (Grant, Moon, and Grant 
2010), may be playing a significant role (McKinnon et al. 2016), continuing the greater 
political focus on PMs and OLs that television brought (McAllister 2004). Gaffes and 
simple mistakes are celebrated in real-time by journalists and social media followers. 
The “increasing leader-centeredness” and the “presidentialization of parties” may also 
be increasing parliamentary dynamism (Gauja 2015). This is also known as “candidate-
centred politics”, which has been rising for some time (Wattenberg 1991). Political 
leaders are more visible and accountable in the modern era than in the past, with their 
survival tied more to their individual popularity than government performance 
(McAllister 2003). This may be increasing their hazard compared to previous eras.  
The increased focus on the individual politician feeds back into the notion that 
the Australian federal party system has become dominated by pragmatism and party 
leaders, making the maintenance of power more important than achieving the goals that 
power could bring (Marsh 2006, van Onselen and Errington 2016). This feedback is 
reinforced if the parties themselves are considered convenient homes for “independent 
political entrepreneurs" little different from ad agencies marketing their candidates for 
election like a product (Panebianco 1988). This “professionalization of politics” has led 
to a loss of diversity, which then results in a narrower outlook and smaller ideological 
drive. By lack of diversity, we refer to the fact that most parliamentarians are now 
career political workers or union leaders, as opposed to small-business owners and 
union members, the stereotypes that the parties might claim to represent. There has been 
 
 
a rise in diverse representation in other societal aspects (for example, gender and 
ethnicity) but this has not yet seen a demonstrable widening of ideology.  
The Howard to Rudd (1), and Rudd (2) to Abbott, transitions are the only PM 
changes in the modern era to have occurred at an election, with the rest of the changes 
occurring because of internal party machinations at least partially based on popularity 
polling. This is tied to the rise in importance of individual popularity, but this factor 
may be about to diminish. The major polling errors ahead of the 2019 Federal Election 
(Schmidt 2019), along with the poor polling performance and the failure of betting 
markets seen in international examples such as Brexit and US President Donald Trump, 
could see parties less prone to changing leader because of poor opinion poll results.  
A second issue influencing modern leadership turnover is climate change. 
Indeed, the modern era could be considered to have started with “the first climate 
change election” in 2007, although predictions that this era might be defined by 
Australia playing “a leading role in global environmental politics” (Rootes 2008) have 
largely been overtaken by the “madness” of the current climate change debate (Hudson 
2019). Certainly, a leader’s position on, and policy response to, climate change and 
energy has been fundamental to their survival as leader (Fielding et al. 2012). 
Another interesting factor within the modern era is that, in Julia Gillard, 
Australia had its first female PM, and with the issue of gender ever-present in politics 
(Stewart 2016), Gillard faced such internal (Labor) and external (media) pressures that 
her tenure as PM was ended not at a general election but in the party room (Williams 
2017, Wright and Holland 2014, Sawer 2013). With female parliamentary participation 
generally rising, it remains to be seen how the next female federal Liberal or Labor 
leader fares and whether the conclusion to Gillard’s Prime Ministership was gender-
based, a symptom of the current dynamic era, or a combination of these and other 
 
 
factors. Even though, as shown earlier, female parliamentary survival curves are not 
particularly different from the male curves, there has only been one female leader of the 
federal Liberal or Labor parties, so there is not yet enough data to say anything about 
gendered leadership survival curves. Of the other major parties of the post-war and 
modern eras, the Australian Democrats have had six female leaders (out of 11) and the 
Australian Greens one (out of three) however neither party has filled the roles of PM or 
OL (Madden 2009). The number of women leading the Liberal and Labor parties at 
state level is also small, while The National Party of Australia has never had a female 
leader at federal level. More data is needed to draw further survival conclusions here. 
It also remains to be seen whether recent reforms introduced by Kevin Rudd 
(Labor) and Scott Morrison (Liberal) will influence leadership dynamics, as it is now 
much more difficult to remove a party leader than it was previously. The only way now 
to remove the Labor leader is for 60 per cent of caucus to sign a petition requesting a 
new election for leader when in opposition, and 75 per cent when in government. The 
new rules govern how the leader is selected, with a ballot of both the parliamentary 
Labor Party and rank-and-file members taking place (Chiru et al. 2015). The Liberal 
party now needs two thirds of the party room to remove a leader (Murphy and Karp 
2018).  
Conclusions 
The current era of Australian politics is certainly dynamic, and it will be fascinating to 
watch whether it continues to resemble the early days of parliament and be different 
from previous eras with a series of short-termed PMs, or whether it’s a mere 
coincidence or statistical blip. The early parliament was a very different environment to 
the modern day, with PMs often defeated on the floor of the parliament and a wide 
variety of influential parties. The modern parliament has its own unique challenges, and 
 
 
both parties would be hoping for some post-war era long-term PMs. The new rules 
surrounding leadership change in both major parties, a rising distrust of polling, the 
changing state and use of the media, policy response to climate change and the 
increasing possibility of more female leadership could add new dimensions to this 
survival analysis.  
Similar leadership turnover has not been seen in New Zealand and Canada, and 
the recent churn of PMs in Great Britain is undoubtedly caused by Brexit machinations. 
On the surface, this suggests uniquely Australian factors at play, however this is not 
necessarily true. Despite a recent election win and being relatively popular, in 
September 2019 New South Wales Premier Gladys Berejiklian narrowly avoid a spill of 
her leadership. In this instance, it was clearly not as a result of polls, and likely not 
gender. The challenge emerged from the decades-old ideological battle between 
moderates and conservatives in the party, in this instance over an abortion bill. The 
party divide may be historical, but the example highlights the capacity of “single-issue 
or emblematic politics” (Marks 2019) to become the focus of political attention. While 
particularly evident in Australia (for example, climate change at the federal level), the 
idea of a single issue being a proxy for a broader battle is not uniquely Australian; 
Brexit is an obvious international example. Such battles may arise from the cartel model 
of modern parties where, with little polarising differences between the large 
professional parties, single issues are chosen as political battlegrounds (Katz and Mair 
2009). In this instance, the fact that those threatening the spill came from particularly 
socially conservative electorates also suggests that parliamentarians may be acting to 
satisfy their electorate (who can agitate in real time through social media), and therefore 
their own survival, rather than the party position.  
 
 
Nevertheless, “street-by-street regionalism” (Marks 2019) works both ways.  
Parties are now able to target specific sections of society through social media 
advertising based on machine learning, with again Brexit and Trump being standout 
international examples. It is not yet resolved how influential these particular advertising 
campaigns were in the overall scheme of those elections, or whether the data was 
collected and used legally, but it is not in doubt that politicians will increasingly use 
data-driven micro-targeting as a political strategy, sending tailored information to 
individuals on topics important to them (Polonski 2017). If voters receive assurances on 
issues close to their hearts, they will hold politicians to account based on them, and the 
circle is complete. Having to respond constantly to criticism means shallower, risk-
averse policy positions. Leadership churn is a symptom of this underlying cycle of 
proxy battles, “gotcha journalism” and the 24-hour news and response cycle (Murphy 
2018). 
This article has shown that survival analysis is a useful tool for examining the 
lifetimes of Australian parliamentarians, especially when considering the survival 
curves in their entirety. We have highlighted differences in the eras of Australian PMs, 
the survival curves of PMs and OLs, and of Liberal and Labor leaders. Statistical tests 
would suggest few differences between rank-and-file male and female parliamentarians, 
and between the House of Representatives and the Senate, however using the survival 
analysis technique, we are able to examine more subtle features of the survival curves, 
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